Oconhecimento proceeding from the soul can in such a way be its perceptions, how much queDescartes called its wills. The wills are classified in duasespcies: those that constitute action of the soul that they finish in the proper soul, whose thought applies it objects that are not material, corporeal, extensive; those that constitute actions that finish in the body, as the movimentosvoluntrios that we co-ordinate conscientiously. (Discardings, 1983: p 224) Thus, to the knowledge is, for Discardings, the condition of all acting that ' is preceded porum; ' querer' ' correspondent, in way that how much to the conformed event econstitudo for the action, we can find its causes already in the deliberation doagente. The man only can want something that knows e, from now on, temliberdade to want it or not: ' ' Not we could want thing some without we want saberque, nor knows it it not to be for an idea; but I do not affirm of modoalgum that this idea is different of proper ao' '. (Discardings, 1983: pg.224) the imediaticidade with that Discardings recognize the thought, would correspond, for it, in the character according to which a thing would not need deoutra thing to demand the recognition of its validity, as if, then, fosseo thought everything that on which immediately it exists in the man, of form to also aservir of data for a constatao of the existence. It is in this manner that, for Discardings, the validity of the proposal ' ' I sou' ' dopensamento is given by the immediacy.
The soul, while totality of the internal experience, has opensamento as it saw only of access. The thus understood thought was characterized as the only premise qualnenhuma another one is previous, characteristic that its successors had not exempted dacrtica. In the theory of Discardings, therefore, the thought was condition of qualqueroutra activity of the reverse speeds cogitans, including the fondness.